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Abstract: This paper analyzes how the stability of the tacit cooperation within a fringe of sev-
eral identical rms is a¤ected by the presence of a more e¢ cient rm which does not take part
in their cooperative agreement. The model assumes that the rms of the fringe adopt stick and
carrotstrategies à la Abreu (1986, 1988) to support cooperation, while the outside rm plays its
one-period best response function to these strategies, regardless of the history of play. Assuming
a linear demand function and constant marginal costs, we then obtain conditions for the coopera-
tion within the fringe to be sustainable and focus on the most cooperative symmetric punishment
(MCSP) that sustains cooperation. We show that the MCSP is harsher when the number of rms
involved in the agreement is relatively large or when their relative cost disadvantage is relatively
small. However, both a larger number of rms and a larger cost disadvantage make it more di¢ cult
to sustain the cooperation.
Keywords: Repeated Game; Tacit Collusion; Optimal Punishments; Cost Asymmetry, Outsider
JEL Classication: C73; D43; L13
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1 Introduction
Since the work of Friedman (1971), the vast majority of the literature on collusion in oligopolistic
markets has posited identical rms and that all of them participate in the cartel agreement. A few
theoretical works have investigated the relationship between the rmse¢ ciencies and the collusive
behaviour, and have shown that asymmetries in the cost functions hinders, in general, collusion,
with the results depending crucially upon the prot sharing rule (e.g., Rothschild 1999, Vasconcelos
2005) and on whether side payments between rms are allowed (see Miklós-Thal 2011). Still, the
theory of tacit collusion has maintained the assumption that all the rms participate in the collusive
agreement, an assumption which is questionable, especially in a context where the oligopoly is made
up of heterogeneous rms. Indeed, a rm with a relatively high competitive advantage may nd it
more protable to opt out of an agreement which includes less competitive rms. In fact, this is
what is suggested by Vasconceloss analysis, where the most e¢ cient rm is shown to be the main
obstacle to the enforceability of the collusion.1 In the present article, we will investigate how the
stability of tacit cooperation between several identical rms is a¤ected by the presence of a more
e¢ cient rm which does not take part in the cooperative agreement.
We employ an oligopoly model in which n symmetric rms, called the fringe, plus one cost-
advantaged rm, called the outsider, play a Cournot game over an innite horizon. The rms of the
fringe adopt two-phase stick-and-carrotpunishment schemes à la Abreu (1986, 1988) to support
their joint-prot maximizing behaviour. I.e., following any deviation, the rms of the fringe conform
to a stick, or, punishment, phase in which they produce a very high quantity (the punishment
output level) for one period (thus resulting in very low market price and prots during that period)
to generate a carrotin the possibility of a subsequent return to cooperative behaviour. Deviations
from the punishment simply cause it to begin again. As for the outsider, it is assumed to play in
every period its best response to the other rmsstrategies regardless of the history. We then focus
on a subgame perfect equilibrium which supports perfect cooperation within the fringe and non-
cooperation between the fringe and the outsider. In this equilibrium, the cooperation among the
rms of the fringe makes them act as if they were a single rm, and hence the outcome corresponds
to that of a Cournot duopoly game.
As one would expect, there exists an innity of punishment output levels which support perfect
cooperation within the fringe as a subgame perfect outcome. To tackle this problem, we thus
1Bae (1987) and Harrington (1991), by investigating the determination of the price of output quotas in heteroge-
neous cartels, reached the same type of conclusion.
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propose a selection criterion that requires equalizing the gains from defection in the cooperative
and punishment phases. We then show that this selection criterion singles out what we call the
most cooperative symmetric punishment (MCSP) in that it most relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraints, both in the cooperative and the punishment phases. In other words, the MCSP yields
the largest possible range of discount factors for which perfect cooperation within the fringe can be
sustained.
The MCSP crucially depends on both the size of the fringe and on the cost asymmetry between
the rms of the fringe and the outsider. More specically, we show that perfect cooperation within
the fringe requires harsher punishment output levels when the fringe is relatively large or when the
cost asymmetry is relatively small. Intuitively, in those cases, each rm of the fringe has more to
gain from cheating on the production cut agreement in the cooperative phase. Harsher punishments
are then required to maintain the cooperation.
Next, we characterize the minimum value for the discount factor above which perfect cooperation
is sustainable as a subgame perfect outcome. In the context of this paper, this minimum value is
interpreted as a measure of the ease of cooperation between the fringe rms. We then show that
an increase in the size of the fringe causes perfect cooperation to be less feasible. This result is
consistent with the argument made by scholars of collective action, that overcoming the free-rider
problem becomes more di¢ cult as the size of the collectivity increases (e.g., Hardin, 1982; Olson,
1982; Sandler 1992). As regards the cost asymmetry between the fringe and the outsider, it only
a¤ects the ease of cooperation if the size of the fringe is su¢ ciently small. If that is the case, a
greater cost asymmetry makes cooperation within the fringe increasingly di¢ cult to sustain. The
intuition is that the larger the cost disadvantage of the rms of the fringe relative to the outsider,
the larger is the one-period loss from the rst phase of the punishment strategy. Hence, more weight
has to be attached to the future stream of payo¤s for the rms to comply with the punishment.
The long history of cartels has produced varied evidence that the strategic interaction with a
more e¢ cient outsider makes the stability of the cartel more precarious. In particular, the issue of
the strength of cooperation between small producers faced with an advantaged competitor proves
especially important for a number of commodity markets, such as cocoa, co¤ee, natural rubber, and
cotton (see, e.g., Gilbert, 1996). For instance, it is widely accepted that the reason for the failure of
the International Agreements on Cocoa (ICCAs) and Co¤ee (ICAs) in the 80s and 90s was the lack
of support from the dominant producer in the marketplace, i.e., Ivory Coast for cocoa and Brazil for
co¤ee (see Gayi, 2004). Similarly, observations on the market for lysine have shown that collusion
between three Asian-based rms collapsed in the early 90s, precipitating a severe price war, due
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to the emergence of a large-scale entrant and more e¢ cient competitor, namely the US-based rm
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) (see de Roos, 2004, 2006).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model. In Section
3, we explore the innitely repeated game and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for perfect
cooperation within the fringe to be sustained as a subgame perfect outcome through the use of stick-
and-carrotstrategies à la Abreu (1986, 1988). Section 4 derives the MCSP, depending on the size of
the fringe and on the cost asymmetry between the rms of the fringe and the outsider. This section
not only provides the lowest discount factor for the sustainability of the perfect cooperation, but
also investigates the impact of the size of the fringe and of the cost asymmetry on the sustainability
of cooperation. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding comments.
2 The model
2.1 The stage game
We start by specifying the details of the stage game G. There are n+1 rms, indexed i = 0; 1; 2; :::; n,
which produce a homogenous product at constant marginal cost. Firm 0 has a marginal cost
normalized to 0, whereas all other rms of the fringe, i = 1; 2; ::::n, incur a marginal cost c  0. Let
qi 2 R+ be the output of rm i, for i = 0; 1; :::; n. Then Q =
nX
i=0
qi is the aggregate output. The
inverse demand function is given by p (Q) = max f0; 1 Qg, with c < 1. Thus, the payo¤ function
of rm 0 is 0 (q0; q1; :::; qn) = p (Q) q0, while that of rm i, for i = 1; :::; n, is i (q0; q1; :::; qn) =
[p (Q)  c] qi.
Let ri (q i), for i = 0; :::; n, be the rm is single-period best reply to the vector of output levels
q i = (q0; :::; qi 1; qi+1:::; qn), so that ri (q i) satises i (ri (q i) ; q i)  i (qi;q i) for all q i 2 Rn+.
Thus, we have r0 (q 0) = max

0;

1 
nP
i=1
qi

=2

, and ri (q i) = max
(
0;
 
1  q0  
P
j 6=i
qj   c
!
=2
)
for i = 1; :::; n.
We focus on symmetric equilibria in the sense that all rms of the fringe produce the same level
of output. For the sake of simplicity, we will write r0 (q 0) = r0 (x) and ri (q i) = ri (q0; x) if qi = x
for i = 1; :::; n. The non-cooperative equilibrium, both within the fringe and between the fringe
and the outsider, is characterized by a pair of output levels
 
qN0 ; q
N

such that r0
 
qN

= qN0 and
ri
 
qN0 ; q
N

= qN for i = 1; :::; n. We obtain
 
qN0 ; q
N

=

1+nc
n+2 ;
1 2c
n+2

, and so the market clears at
price pN = (1 + nc) = (n+ 2).
To guarantee that each rm in the stage game has a positive market share, we make the following
assumption.
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Assumption 1: c < 1=2:
Write N0 for 0
 
qN0 ; q
N ; :::; qN

, the payo¤ of the outsider, and write N for i
 
qN0 ; q
N ; :::; qN

,
the identical payo¤ for each rm of the fringe, when there is non-cooperation within the fringe. We
have
N =

1  2c
n+ 2
2
; (1)
and
N0 =

1 + nc
n+ 2
2
: (2)
with N0 > 
N .
2.2 Cooperation within the fringe
Assume now that the rms of the fringe collude and jointly choose a common level of output q
so as to maximize the sum of their prots. Yet, they continue playing non-cooperatively with the
outsider, so that the outcome resembles that of a Cournot duopoly game between the fringe and
the outsider. The cooperative output from the viewpoint of the fringe is given by the maximization
of
nP
i=1
i (q0; q; :::; q) = (p (Q)  c)nq with respect to q, where Q = nq + q0. The best reply of
any rm of the fringe to the output level q0 produced by the outsider is thus given by the function
Ri (q0) = max f0; (1  q0   c) =2ng. The non-cooperative equilibrium between the fringe, which acts
as if it were a single rm, and the outsider is thus given by a pair of output levels
 
qC0 ; q
C

such that
r0
 
qC

= qC0 and Ri
 
qC0

= qC , for i = 1; :::; n. Hence, when the rms of the fringe fully cooperate
with each other, we have
 
qC0 ; q
C

=
 
1+c
3 ;
1 2c
3n

.
Write C0 for 0
 
qC0 ; q
C ; :::; qC

, the payo¤ of the outsider, and write C for i
 
qC0 ; q
C ; :::; qC

,
for i = 1; :::; n, the identical payo¤ for each rm of the fringe when there is cooperation within the
fringe. The market price equilibrium is pC = (a+ c)=3, and then
C =
1
n

1  2c
3
2
; (3)
and
C0 =

1 + c
3
2
: (4)
We can verify that C   N = n2   5n + 4  0, which is positive for n  4. Hence, to make
the problem interesting, we shall make the following assumption throughout the remainder of our
analysis.
Assumption 2. n  4:
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Moreover, we have that C0  N0 = (1  2c)(n  1)  0. In other words, the outsider always benets
from cooperation within the fringe. This is because cooperation within the fringe reduces output
levels and increases the market price, which in turn increases the prot of the outsider.
3 The innitely repeated game
3.1 Preliminaries
The n+1 rms play an innitely repeated game with discounting. Let G1 () be the repeated game
obtained by repeating G innitely often, and where  2 (0; 1) is the discount parameter per period for
each player. We assume that the output produced by each rm in each period is perfectly observed
by all rms. Let q0(t) 2 R+ and q 0(t) = (q1(t); :::; qn(t)) 2 Rn+ be respectively the output level
produced by the outsider and the vector of outputs produced by the n rms of the fringe in period t.
Hence, a (nite) history in period t  1 is h(t) = (h0(t); h 0(t)), where h0(t) = (q0(1); :::; q0(t  1))
and h 0(t) = (q 0(0); :::; q 0(t  1)). Let Ht be the set of t-period histories. We further dene the
initial history to be the null set, H0 = f;g, and H to be the set of all possible publicly observable
histories, H =
1[
t=0
Ht. A pure strategy for rm i in G1 (), for i = 0; 1; 2; :::; n, is a mapping from
the set of all possible histories into the set of output levels, i : H ! R+.
Let  0 = (1; :::; n) be the strategy prole of the rms of the fringe. Any strategy prole  =
(0;  0) generates an output path fq0 () (t); q 0 () (t)g1t=0 dened inductively by (q0 () (0); q 0 () (0)) =
 (;) and (q0 () (t); q 0()(t)) =  (t) ((q0 () (0); q 0 () (0)) ; :::; (q0 () (t  1); q 0 () (t  1))) for
all t  1. An outcome path fq0 () (t); q 0 () (t)g1t=0 thus implies an innite stream of stage-game
payo¤s fi (q0 () (t); q 0 () (t))g1t=0 for rms i = 0; 1; :::; n. The discounted payo¤ to rm i from
the innite sequence of stage-game payo¤s fi(t)g1t=0 is given by
1P
t=0
ti(t), so that its payo¤ in
G1 () obtained with the strategy prole  is
i () =
1X
t=0
ti (q0 () (t); q 0 () (t)) : (5)
A strategy prole  is a Nash equilibrium in G1 () if 0 is a best response to  0 and if i, for
i = 1; :::; n, is a best response to  0ni = (1; :::; i 1; i+1; :::; n) and to 0. And it is a subgame
perfect equilibrium in G1 () if after every history h 2 H,  jh (i.e., the continuation of  after h) is
a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding subgame. We will restrict attention to stationary subgame
perfect equilibria (SSPE), i.e., equilibria in which after any history, a stationary prole of actions is
played thereafter, and which also satisfy the additional requirement of symmetry within the fringe,
in the sense that all rms of the fringe produce the same level of output at every history.
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3.2 The two-phase punishmentcooperation scheme
Throughout the paper, we suppose that the rms of the fringe adopt stick-and-carrotstrategies à
la Abreu (1986, 1988) to support the joint-prot maximizing level of output as a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Formally, for any level of output q0 produced by the outsider in period t, consider two
levels of output produced by any rm of the fringe as functions of q0, i.e., (q^ (q0) ; ~q (q0)), and dene
a two-phase punishmentcooperation prole  (q^ (q0) ; ~q (q0)) to be stick-and-carrot strategies in
which all rms of the fringe produce ~q (q0) in the rst period and thereafter play q^ (q0), with any
deviation from these strategies causing this prescription to be repeated. Intuitively, ~q (q0) is the
stick, involving a high level of output and q^ (q0) is the carrot, involving a low and cooperative
level of output. The punishment species a single-period penalty followed by repeated play of the
carrot. Deviations from the punishment simply cause it to begin again.
Again, we are concerned with the best subgame perfect equilibrium from the viewpoint of the
rms of the fringe and we further assume that the outsider plays in every period its best response to
the other rmsstrategies regardless of the history, i.e., 0 (h(t)) = r0 (q 0(t)) for all h(t). During
the cooperative phase within the fringe, we thus pay attention to the levels of output q^ (q0) =
Ri
 
qC0

= qC for i = 1; :::; n and r0
 
qC

= qC0 . During the punishment phase, we are concerned
with the levels of output ~q (q0) = x and r0 (x) = qx0 . This strategy prole will be henceforth denoted
by 
 
qC ; x

, where qC is the short notation for
 
qC0 ; q
C

and x = (qx0 ; x).
The prole 
 
qC ; x

can sustain the cooperation within the fringe as a subgame perfect equi-
librium output path if and only if a single period deviation from the strategy (and sticking to it
subsequently) after any history is not protable for any rm of the fringe. There are two kinds
of histories to check. The rst is that no single deviation has taken place in the previous periods,
so that the rms are in a cooperative phase. The second state to check is the one where a rm
deviated from the cooperative agreement in the previous period, so that the rms are currently in
the punishment phase.
Suppose rst that the rms of the fringe are in a cooperative phase, i.e., they all produce qC
and the outsider produces qC0 , and that rm i considers deviating from q
C . The deviator maximizes
i
 
qC0 ; q
C ; :::; qi; :::; q
C

= max

0;
 
1  qi   (n  1) qC   qC0   c

qi
	
with respect to qi and hence
the optimal deviation output is given by qD = (n+ 1) (1  2c) =6n.
Let D = i
 
qC0 ; q
C ; :::; qD; :::; qC

be the optimal deviation prot for each rm i in the fringe.
We have
D =

(n+ 1) (1  2c)
6n
2
: (6)
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The deviation payo¤ given by (6) is decreasing in c. Hence, the greater the cost advantage of the
outsider, the lower is the temptation to deviate from the cooperative phase for each rm of the
fringe. Moreover, a larger size of the fringe also reduces the deviation payo¤.
Now, let P (x) = i (r0 (x) ; x; :::; x) denote the payo¤ of rm i of the fringe when each fringe
rm produces x units of output while the outsider best responds to this level. Let V P be the present
discounted value of the payo¤s following a deviation, that is,
V P = P (x) +

1   
C : (7)
No rm of the fringe has an incentive to deviate from 
 
qC ; x

in the cooperative phase if and only
if
D + V P  1
1   
C : (8)
Intuitively, (8) says that the one-shot deviation gain from the cooperative phase plus the discounted
payo¤ of entering the punishment phase next period must not exceed the payo¤ from continued
cooperation. Rearranging this inequality and using (7), we have the following incentive compatibility
constraint along the cooperative path
  C (x) = 
D   C
C   P (x) : (9)
Suppose now that one rm deviated from 
 
qC ; x

in the previous period, so that the rms of
the fringe are in the punishment phase in the current period. Suppose also that rm i considers
deviating from x and let DP (x) be the optimal deviation payo¤ during the punishment phase,
i.e., DP (x) = i
 
r0 (x) ; x; :::; q
DP (x) ; :::; x

where qDP (x) = arg max
qi
i (r0 (x) ; x; :::; qi; :::; x). No
rm of the fringe has an incentive to deviate from 
 
qC ; x

during the punishment phase if and
only if
DP (x) + V P  V P : (10)
Intuitively, the one-shot deviation gain from the punishment phase plus the discounted payo¤ of
staying in the punishment phase next period must not exceed the present value of abiding by the
punishment rule (which guarantees a return to the cooperative phase next period). Rearranging
this inequality and using (7), we have the following incentive compatibility constraint along the
punishment path:
  P (x) = 
DP (x)  P (x)
C   P (x) : (11)
Hence, the strategy prole 
 
qC ; x

is subgame perfect if and only if
  max
n
C (x) ; P (x)
o
: (12)
9
We are now ready to determine the set of punishment output levels x for which the strategy prole

 
qC ; x

forms a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In the punishment phase, the outsider optimally responds to the punishment output x, thereby
producing
r0 (x) =
8<:
1 nx
2 if x < ~x;
0 otherwise,
(13)
where ~x = 1=n corresponds to the threshold value of the punishment output level above which the
market price turns out to be nil for all x  ~x, thereby driving the outsider out of business during
the punishment period. Each rm within the fringe then obtains
P (x) =
8<: x

1 2c nx
2

if x < ~x;
 cx otherwise.
(14)
The punishment payo¤ function changes when x  ~x because (again) the market price becomes
zero, so that the rms of the fringe produce and give the good for free. Clearly, in that case, the
prot of any rm of the fringe is negative. However, even if the market price is positive (i.e., when
x < ~x), the punishment prot may still be negative due to dumping, with a market price which falls
short of c. This is the case for x  (1  2c) =n. One can also observe that P (x) is decreasing in x
for any x  (1  2c) =2n. The idea is that raising the punishment output oods the market, which
exerts a downward pressure on the market price. Nevertheless, the loss entailed by the punishment
should be recouped by reverting back to cooperative behaviour.
We can now determine the optimal deviation payo¤ for the rm which defects from the punish-
ment phase. Anticipating the outsiders best reply to x, the payo¤ function for the deviator i is
given by
i (r0 (x) ; x; :::; qi; :::; x) =
8<: maxf0; [1  qi   (n  1)x 
1 nx
2   cqi]g if x < ~x;
max f0; [1  qi   (n  1)x  c] qig otherwise.
(15)
Note that the rm which deviates from the punishment phase can always choose not to produce
(with a payo¤ equal to 0) if it cannot get positive prots. Denote by x^ = (1  2c) = (n  2) and x^0 =
(1  c) = (n  1) two peculiar punishment outputs levels. As shown below, they are the minimum
punishment threats required to drive the deviator out of business depending on whether the market
price is positive or nil on the punishment path.
Maximizing the above payo¤ function with respect to qi, we obtain the optimal deviation output
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during the punishment phase, i.e.,
qDP (x) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 2c x(n 2)
4 if

either c  1n and x < x^;
or c < 1n and x < ~x;
1 c x(n 1)
2 if c <
1
n and ~x  x < x^0;
0 otherwise.
(16)
When x < ~x, the market price is positive and hence the outsider is better o¤ producing r0 (x) > 0,
as one can see from (13). In this situation, the deviator also produces strictly positive quantities
whenever x < x^. When c < 1n , we have ~x < x^, so that x < x^ whenever x < ~x. If however c  1n , we
have x^  ~x and hence the relevant constraint is indeed given by x^.
When the punishment output is relatively large, i.e., when x  ~x, the market price is equal to 0
and hence the best response of the outsider is to stay out of the market, i.e., r0 (x) = 0. However,
it might possible that the behaviour of the deviator, by producing a lower level of output than the
agreed punishment output level, gives rise to a positive market price, so that the optimal deviation
output is positive. For this situation to happens, one must have for x 2 [~x; x^0), which necessarily
implies ~x < x^0 and c < 1n . In all other cases, i.e., c  1n and x  x^ or c < 1n and x  x^0, we have
qDP (x) = 0.
Substituting (16) into (15) yields the optimal deviation payo¤ function
DP (x) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
h
1 2c x(n 2)
4
i2
if

either c  1n and x < x^;
or c < 1n and x < ~x;h
1 c x(n 1)
2
i2
if c < 1n and ~x  x < x^0;
0 otherwise.
(17)
DP (x) is decreasing in c whenever the market price induced by a deviation from the punishment
path is positive. In other words, the higher the cost advantage of the outsider, the lower is the
incentive to deviate from the punishment phase for any rm of the fringe even though the outsider
is driven out of business, which happens when c < 1n and ~x  x < x^0, arranging a market price
equal to 0 in the absence of a deviation.
We now state the following lemma, which will prove useful.2
Lemma 1. Let x = 2=3n be the highest solution to C  P (x) = 0, with  = 1 2c. A necessary
condition for the strategy prole 
 
qC ; x

to be a SSPE is then that x  x.
The punishment output level must be su¢ ciently large for the strategy prole 
 
qC ; x

to be
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Punishments which are too small strengthen the incentives to
2All the proofs are given in the Appendix.
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deviate either from the cooperative phase by raising P (x), or from the punishment phase by
raising DP (x).
4 The most cooperative symmetric punishment
We now determine the strongest credible punishment in the sense that x 2 [x;+1) is chosen to
minimize the continuation value following a deviation given by (7) subject to the incentive constraints
(8) and (10). This requires that the incentive constraint along the punishment phase (10) holds with
equality, or equivalently that  = P (x). Suppose it is not. Then the punishment output level x
can be raised so as to decrease both DP (x) and the continuation valuation V P until (10) holds
with strict equality. Indeed, since P (x) is decreasing in x for any x  =2n, V P is also decreasing
in x on [x;+1), since =2n < x. Furthermore, decreasing V P makes the incentive constraint along
the cooperative path, given by (8), more likely to be satised, because C and D do not depend
on x. Note that when DP (x) = 0, the harshest punishment V P = 0, i.e., the punishment level
such that the losses incurred by the rm during the punishment phase are exactly recouped by the
cooperative prots in the following periods, can be sustained since the incentive constraint (10)
holds as an equality.3
Typically, there are multiple punishment levels such that  = P (x) and such that the incentive
constraint in the cooperative phase (8) holds. To deal with this multiplicity problem, we use the
following selection criterion. Observing that C (x) is decreasing in x, we further impose that (8)
holds with strict equality, i.e.,  = C (x), so that we focus on the strongest credible punishment
levels satisfying C (x) = P (x). From (14) and (17), both payo¤ functions P (x) and DP (x)
are not everywhere di¤erentiable on [x;+1), and moreover DP (x) may be non-monotonic on this
set. Hence, the equation C (x) = P (x) may admit several solutions. Therefore, we single out the
highest value of x, say x, satisfying this equality. In turn, we ensure that P (x) is strictly increasing
in x on [x;+1). Hence, x corresponds to the (strongest credible) punishment level which implies
the largest possible range of discount factors for which cooperation within the fringe can be enforced
as an SSPE. We call this punishment level the most cooperative symmetric punishment (MCSP). In
other words, the MCSP is the punishment output level which most relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraints both in the cooperative and the punishment phases.
First, using (8) and (10), equation C (x) = P (x) becomes

DP (x)  P (x) = D   C,
3When the most severe punishment can be sustained, Abreu (1986) has shown that the stick and carrotstrategy
is optimal in the set of symmetric stationary strategies.
12
which reduces to
DP (x)  P (x) =

 (n  1)
6n
2
: (18)
As a result, our selection criterion requires that the net gain from deviating from the cooperative
path is equal to that from deviating from the punishment path. Building on the previous analysis,
we will distinguish in what follows between two cases: rst, c  1n , and second, c < 1n .
4.1 Case 1: c  1
n
, a high competitive disadvantage of the fringe
Recall that c  1n is equivalent to x^  ~x, which means that the best deviation prot from the
punishment path can be equal to 0 (for x  x^) even though the market price is positive (for x < ~x).
When c  1=n, there are three types of punishment regimes, depending on the severity of the
punishment output level relative to x^ and ~x. When the punishment output level is higher than ~x,
the outsider is driven out of business (see (13)), since the market price falls down to 0, while the
deviator cannot do better than cutting its production level to 0 (see (16)). The MCSP which solves
(18) in [~x;+1) will be denoted by x1 whenever it exists. If not, we turn to less severe punishment
levels inside [x^; ~x). In this case, the market price is positive and the outsider is better o¤ remaining
active in the market. But again, in this case, the best deviation from the punishment path is to cut
the production level to 0. The MCSP which solves (18) in [x^; ~x) will be denoted by x01 whenever it
exists. Otherwise, given Lemma 1, we focus on less severe subgame perfect punishments within the
interval [x; x^). In this case, the market price is still positive and both the outsider and the deviator
are active in the market. The MCSP, if it exists, which solves (18) in [x; x^) will be denoted by x001 .
Proposition 1. Assume that c  1n . Furthermore, let f(n) be the lowest value of c which satises
x1   ~x = 0. Then, the strategy prole 
 
qC ; x

admits a unique MCSP given by : (i) x1  ~x if
n  9 and c  f(n); (ii) x01 2 [x^; ~x) if n  9 and c > f(n); (iii) x001 2 [x; x^) if n < 9.
The MCSP, i.e., the punishment output level which most relaxes the incentive compatibility con-
straints on both the cooperative and punishment paths, depends on both the number of rms within
the fringe and on their competitive disadvantage relative to the outsider. First, it must be remem-
bered that the two incentive constraints depend on the harshness of the punishment. The higher
the punishment output level, the lower is the prot of any rm of the fringe on the punishment
path (i.e., @P (x) =@x < 0). This makes the incentive constraint for cooperation more likely to
be satised (i.e., @C (x) =@x < 0). However, a harsher punishment also raises the temptation to
deviate from the punishment path, which tightens the incentive constraint on this path. We indeed
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show, in the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2, that @P (x) =@x > 0 for any punishment output level
above the one which makes the two incentive constraints binding.
Now observe that the lower the size of the fringe, the lower is the gain from cheating on the
cooperative path, given by D   C . Intuitively, with a small number of rms within the fringe,
each rm has a relatively large market so that the potential gain of deviating by producing beyond
the production cut agreement is relatively low. Therefore, when the size of the fringe is relatively
low (i.e., n < 9) a relatively low punishment output level x001 2 [x; x^) is su¢ cient to sustain the
cooperation among the rms of the fringe and to satisfy the two incentive compatibility constraints.
Point A in Figure 1 shows a parameter conguration (n; c) for which the MCSP is x001 . Treating the
size of the fringe as a continuous variable, we show in the Appendix that the threshold value of n
below which the MCSP is given by x001 is precisely equal to ~n =
 
9 +
p
73

=2 ' 8:77.
As the number of rms increases to a certain point (i.e., n  9) the higher temptation to deviate
from cooperation requires harsher punishments. However, in this case, the interval within which
the punishment output levels can fall depends on the competitive disadvantage of the rms of the
fringe. More specically, consider now the dotted arrow in Figure 1 which depicts from point A,
and for a given level of c, an increase in the size of the fringe above 9. Cooperation then requires
a punishment output level x01 harsher than x
00
1 , as is the case at point B, provided that c > f(n).
In this case, the best deviation prot from the punishment path is equal to 0, but the outsider still
makes a positive prot since the market price remains positive.
Now consider that the cost disadvantage of the rms of the fringe, for a given size n, decreases,
as depicted by the bold arrow starting from point B in Figure 1. If c becomes smaller than f(n),
cooperation requires a punishment output level x1 harsher than x01, as is the case at point C. An
explanation of this is that the benet from cheating on the cooperative path is decreasing in c.
The larger the competitive disadvantage of the rms, the lower is the benet from cheating on the
production cut agreement. Conversely, the lower the cost competitiveness of the rms, the higher is
the incentive to defect from the punishment path because of the high level of production prescribed
by the punishment scheme. Therefore, when c is relatively large (i.e., c > f(n)), a relatively low
punishment output level (i.e., x01 2 [x^; ~x)) is su¢ cient to sustain the cooperation, thus relaxing
the incentive constraint on the punishment path. Finally, a relatively low cost disadvantage (i.e.,
c  f(n)) together with a large size of the fringe requires the highest punishment level (i.e., x1  ~x).
Note again that in this case, the market price falls to 0, so that the best deviation prot from the
punishment phase for any rm of the fringe as well the prot of the outsider are both equal to 0.
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4.2 Case 2: c < 1
n
, a low competitive disadvantage of the fringe
Recall that c < 1n is equivalent to ~x < x^
0, which means that the best deviation prot from the
punishment path can be positive (for x < x^0) even though the market price is equal to 0 in the
absence of a deviation (for x  ~x).
As in the previous case, when c < 1n , there are three types of punishment regimes, depending on
the severity of the punishment output level relative to x^0 and ~x. First, when the punishment output
level is higher than x^0, then both the market price and the best deviation prot from the punishment
path are equal to 0. Furthermore, in this case, the prot of a rm which abides by the punishment
rule is the same as that prevailing when c  1=n and x  ~x. Therefore, the MCSP which solves (18)
in [x^0;+1) must still be given by x1, provided it exists. If not, we turn to less severe punishment
output levels within the interval [~x; x^0). In this case, the market price is still equal to 0 if all rms of
the fringe abide by the punishment rule. If however a rm decides to deviate from the punishment
path, it produces a level of output lower than the agreed punishment level. This causes a positive
market price so that the deviator makes positive prots, as shown by (17). Provided it exists, the
MCSP within the interval [~x; x^0) will be denoted by x02. If it does not exist, then we look for a
solution to (18) in the interval [x; ~x). In this case, the prot of a rm in the punishment phase and
that of the deviator are identical to those obtained in the previous case, where c  1=n and [x; x^)
(since now ~x < x^). Therefore, if it exists, the MCSP which solves (18) in [x; ~x) must be given by
x001 .
Proposition 2. Assume that c < 1n . Furthermore, let h(n) be the lowest value of c which satises
x1   x^0 = 0, and g(n) the highest value of c which satises x02   ~x = 0. Then, the strategy prole

 
qC ; x

admits a unique MCSP given by (i) x1  x^0 if n  9 or if n < 9 and c  h(n); (ii)
x02 2 [~x; x^0) if n 2 f7; 8g and c 2 (h(n); g(n)]; (iii) x001 2 [x; ~x) if n 2 f7; 8g and c > g(n) or if
n < 7 and c > h(n) > g(n).
The characterization of the MCSP when c < 1n is slightly more complicated than when c  1n . One
can observe that there are two sets of parameters under which the MCSP with c < 1n is exactly the
same as when c  1n . When the size of the fringe is relatively small (i.e., n < 9), the lowest MCSP is
still given by x001 , but now there is a lower bound to the competitive disadvantage of the rms (i.e.,
c > g(n) if n = f7; 8g or c > h(n) if n < 7). If this additional constraint is not satised (i.e., when
c  h(n)), then the MCSP is given by x1, which was obtained in the previous case (i.e., c  1n ) for
a relatively low disadvantage cost (i.e., c  f(n) provided c  1n ) and a relatively large size of the
fringe (i.e., n  9). In the current size, this last condition (i.e., n  9) also guarantees that x1 is the
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MCSP independently of the disadvantage cost. Finally, there is now a new punishment level given
by x02, which holds only for intermediate values of the size of the fringe (i.e., n 2 f7; 8g) and of the
disadvantage cost (i.e., c 2 (h(n); g(n)].
The driving forces behind the results in Proposition 2 are the same as those underlying Propo-
sition 1. Again, this can be explained with the help of a gure. Point A in Figure 2 represents a
parameter conguration for which n < 9 and c is relatively large (i.e., c  max fh(n); g(n)g). As the
incentive to deviate in the cooperative phase is relatively low, cooperation within the fringe can be
supported by the MCSP which involves the least severe punishment output level x001 . An increase
in the size of the fringe, for a given level of c, raises the temptation to deviate from the cooperative
path, which may require a punishment output level x02 harsher than x
00
1 . This is illustrated by the
dotted arrow from point A to point B in Figure 2. Observe that the parameter conguration for
which x02 is the MCSP is quite limited (i.e., n 2 f7; 8g and h(n) < c  g(n)4). This restricted
parameter area corresponds to the situation where a rm which deviates from the punishment path
causes a positive market price, by producing less than the agreed punishment level, thus obtaining
positive prots.
Now assume that the cost disadvantage of the rms of the fringe, for a given size n, decreases
below h(n), as depicted by the bold arrow starting from point B in Figure 2. Just as for an increase
in n, a greater cost competitiveness increases the temptation to deviate from the cooperative path.
This thus requires a punishment output level x1 harsher than both x02 and x
00
1 , as shown by point C
in Figure 2. When n  9, the MCSP is also given by x1 independently of c because in that case the
assumption that c < 1=n necessarily implies c  h(n) < 1=n. This parameter area corresponds to a
situation where the best deviation prot from the punishment path is equal to 0 (just as the market
price is in the punishment path). To summarize, a relatively large size of the fringe and a relatively
small disadvantage cost require greater punishment output levels than in the reverse situation.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, one can conclude that the MCSP is characterized by the
harshest punishment output level x1 independently of n, when the cost disadvantage of the rms
of the fringe is low enough, i.e., when c  h(n)  1=n  f(n)). In particular, this is the case when
the fringe is as e¢ cient as the outsider, i.e., when c = 0. However, we cannot state that the MCSP
is given by x1 independently of c, if n is large enough (or that it is given by the lowest punishment
output level x001 independently of c if n is low enough). This is a clear illustration of the fact that
4Using the expression of h(n) given by (A9) and that of g(n) given by (A16) in the Appendix, we have that c
must lie in the interval
hp
73  7
i
=2
p
73; 1=11
i
' (0:0904; 0:0909] when n = 7, and
hp
919  24
i
=2
p
919; 2=19
i
'
(0:1042; 0:1052] when n = 8.
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the existence of di¤erent punishment regimes relies on the cost asymmetry between the fringe and
the outsider.
4.3 The minimum discount factor
We can now determine the minimum discount factor such that the two incentive compatibility
constraints are binding. That is, we substitute the MCSP which solves (18) into (9) or (11). From
the analysis of the previous section, we have that the MCSP can take four di¤erent expressions,
depending on c, n, and on the interval within which the punishment output level x can fall.
We start by considering Case 1. If n  9 and c  f(n), then the MCSP is x1, given by (A1) in
the Appendix. This also implies P (x1) =  cx1 since x1  ~x. Substituting P (x1), C given by
(3), and D given by (6) into C (x) given by (9), we obtain
1(n) =
(n  1)2
(n+ 1)
2 : (19)
Suppose now that n  9 and c > f(n), so that the MCSP is x01, given by (A5) in the Appendix.
This also implies P (x01) = x
0
1 [(   nx01) =2], since x01 2 [x^; ~x). Substituting P (x01), C , and D
into (9), we obtain again 1(n) given by (19). This is not surprising, since DP (x1) = DP (x01) = 0,
and thus (18) yields that  P (x1) =  P (x01) = D   C . It follows that C (x1) = C (x01) =
D   C =D.
Now if n < 9, the MCSP is x001 , given by (A6) in the Appendix. We also have 
P (x) =
x001 [(   nx001) =2], since x001 < x^  ~x. Substituting P (x001), C , and D into (9), we obtain
01(n) =
(n  1) (n+ 2)2
24n (n  2) ; (20)
which is lower than 1 for any 4  n < 9.
We now consider Case 2. If n  9 or n < 9 and c  h(n) < 1=n, the MCSP is given by x1 and
hence  (x1) =  cx1 since x1  ~x. Hence, the threshold value of the discount factor is the same
as when n  9 and 1=n  c  f(n), namely, 1(n) given by (19). If n 2 f7; 8g and c > g(n) or if
n < 7 and c > h(n) > g(n), the MCSP is given by x001 , and hence 
P (x001) = x
00
1 [(   nx001) =2], since
x001 < ~x. It follows that the threshold value of the discount factor has the same expression as that
obtained when n  9 and c  1=n, namely, 01(n) is given by (20).
Finally, suppose that n 2 f7; 8g and h (n) < c  g(n) so that the MCSP is x02 given by (A13) in
the Appendix. We then have  (x02) =  cx02, since x02  ~x. Now, substituting P (x02), C , and C
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into (9), we obtain
02(n; c) =
2 (n  1)4
4n

2   n [c (17c+ 1) + 2] + n2 [5c(1  c) + 1] + 3c
q
2 (n  1)4   36n2c [(n  1)  cn]
 :
(21)
The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 3. The minimal threshold for the discount factor above which the strategy prole

 
qC ; x

forms an SSPE is given by
(i) 1(n) if (ia) n  9; or n < 9 and c  h(n) < 1=n;
(ii) 01(n) if (ia) n < 9 and c  1=n; or n 2 f7; 8g and h(n) < g(n) < c < 1=n; or n < 7 and
g(n) < h(n) < c < 1=n;
(iii) 02(n; c) if n 2 f7; 8g and h (n) < c  g(n) < 1=n.
Clearly, 1(n) is increasing in n and approaches 1 as the size of the fringe goes to innity. One can
also verify that 01(n) is increasing in n for n  5.5 Furthermore, since 01(8) is strictly lower than
1(9), one can conclude that when c  1=n, an increase in the size of the fringe generally makes
cooperation more di¢ cult to sustain (except if the fringe increases from 4 to 5 rms). For c  1=n,
the evolution of the minimum discount factor as a function of the size of the fringe is depicted in
Figure 3. It is discontinuous because the MCSP is itself discontinuous at ~n =
 
9 +
p
73

=2 ' 8:77.
For c < 1=n, there is a (restricted) parameter conguration, i.e., n 2 f7; 8g and c 2 (h(n); g(n)],
which gives rise to a third expression for the minimum discount factor, viz., 02(n; c). We show in
the Appendix, Section 6.4, that 01(6) < 
0
2(7; c) < 
0
2(8; c) < 1(9), as depicted in Figure 4. In
other words, when c < 1=n, we still obtain that the cooperation within the fringe is more di¢ cult
to sustain as the size of the fringe increases.
Keeping the size of the fringe n constant, we can also evaluate the impact of a change in c on
both the MCSP and the sustainability of cooperation within the fringe. First, observe that both
1(n) and 
0
1(n) are independent of the cost disadvantage of the fringe. In other words, equalizing
the net benets from deviating from the cooperative and punishment paths may yield a punishment
threat (i.e., the MCSP x1, x01, or x
00
1 , depending on the parameter conguration), which makes the
sustainability of the cooperation within the fringe immune to its disadvantage cost. Yet, whether
the relevant minimal discount factor is given by 1(n) or 
0
1(n) depends on the relation between
5The sign of the derivative of 01(n) with respect to n is the same as the sign of n3   6n2 + 6n   4. Using
Mathematica, one obtains that it admits a unique real root given by n ' 4:95, under (above) which the polynomial
is negative (positive).
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c and n. Furthermore, still depending on the parameter pair (c; n), the minimum discount factor
might also be given by 02(n; c), which is a function of c.
If n < 7, the lowest discount factor is 1(n) when c  h(n), but it is given by 01(n) when
c > h(n). And one can easily verify that 01(n) > 1(n) for any n < 7. If n 2 f7; 8g, then the
lowest discount factor is 1(n) when c  h(n), but is 02(n; c) when c 2 (h(n); g(n)], or 01(n) when
c > g(n). We show in the Appendix, Section 6.4, that 02(n; c) is increasing in c and furthermore
that 1(n) < 
0
2(n; c) < 
0
1(n) for n 2 f7; 8g and c 2 (h(n); g(n)]. Finally, if n  9, then the lowest
discount factor is given by 1(n) independently of c. In other words, cooperation within the fringe
is more di¢ cult to sustain as the cost asymmetry increases, provided the size of the fringe is lower
than 9 rms. When the size of the fringe is larger than 9 rms, then the cost disadvantage of the
rms (relative to the outsider) has no e¤ect on the di¢ culty in sustaining the cooperation within
the fringe. Yet, in this case, the MCSP depends on c, since it is given by x1 for c  f(n) and by
x01 < x1 for c > f(n).
What intuition can we now provide about the e¤ects of changes in the size and the competitive
disadvantage of the fringe on the minimum discount factor?
As regards the impact of the size of the fringe, the results illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 are in line
with the traditional literature on tacit collusion in symmetric oligopoly games. It becomes harder to
collude with more rms because of the greater incentive to deviate from the cooperative agreement.
Indeed, in a similar model, i.e., in a Cournot market with linear demand and constant marginal
costs, but with all rms being identical and participating in the collusive agreement, the critical
discount factor is increasing in the number of rms involved in the agreement whether rms use
Nash-reversion strategies (see Vives, 1999, p. 307) or stick-and-carrot strategies (see Motta, 2004,
p. 171). A general explanation still available here is that a larger number of rms has the e¤ect
of decreasing the individual collusive prot, thereby increasing the net gain from deviating in the
cooperative phase, captured by D C . One important di¤erence from the traditional literature is
that the deviating rm gains less in our setup, since the resulting outcome following the deviation is
an (asymmetric) triopoly. Moreover, the MCSP requires equalizing the gains from deviating in the
cooperative and the punishment phases. When the increase in the number of rms within the fringe
leads to a more severe punishment regime, the gain from cheating in the punishment phase reected
by DP (x) P (x) rises. This partly o¤sets the increase in D C . However, a harsher punishment
output level also raises the loss due to the punishment in the cooperative phase (i.e., C   P (x)),
which causes a decline of C (x). This e¤ect contradicts the overall result that an increase in n at
the MCSP makes cooperation less likely. We can thus conclude that the direct, positive e¤ect on
19
the minimum discount factor caused by an increase in the size of the fringe dominates the induced
negative e¤ect associated with a consequent switch to a more severe punishment regime.
The same reasoning helps separate the intricate e¤ects of changes in the competitive disadvantage
of the fringe on the minimum discount factor. As previously seen, the overall result is that an
increase in c does not make it easier to sustain the cooperation. This is far from intuitive, since a
decrease in the competitiveness of the fringe leads to a reduction in the net gain from deviating in
the cooperative phase, which, on the contrary, strengthens the incentive to cooperate. Nevertheless,
the equalization of deviation gains required by the MCSP implies a reduction in the net gain from
deviating in the punishment phase. This can be achieved by a softer punishment regime, which in
turn reduces the one-period loss caused by punishment in the cooperative phase, thereby dampening
the incentive to cooperate. As a result, the latter e¤ect dominates the direct, negative impact on
the minimum discount factor of the lower gain from cheating in the cooperative phase.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the ability of several identical rms to maintain perfect cooperation
in a quantity-setting supergame in the presence of a low-cost rm which does not take part in
the cooperative agreement. The less competitive rms, collectively referred to as the fringe, are
assumed to adopt two-phase punishment schemes in the style of Abreu (1986, 1988) to sustain the
joint-prot maximizing outcome, while the outsider is assumed to play its one-period best response
to the fringe rmsstrategies in every period. We focused on the maximal punishment regime that
can be enforced, referred to as the MCSP, and then determined the minimal threshold value for the
discount factor above which perfect cooperation can be sustained as a (stationary) subgame perfect
equilibrium.
An important insight to be gained from this analysis is that the rmsability to sustain the coop-
eration in the presence of a more competitive and non-cooperative rm depends crucially, and in a
quite complex way, on the number of rms involved in the agreement and on their cost disadvantage
relative to the non-participating rm. Indeed, the MCSP and the corresponding minimal discount
factor result from the interplay between the rmsincentives to deviate from the cooperative agree-
ment, on the one hand, and on their incentives to deviate from the punishment phase, on the other.
The overall insight is that the MCSP requires less severe punishments when the fringe either is
at a higher competitive disadvantage, or is smaller. At lower levels of the MCSP, the minimum
of patience needed to cooperate is higher than if rms were at a lower competitive disadvantage.
Hence, cooperation proves more di¢ cult although deviation is less benecial. By contrast, when the
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fringe is smaller, cooperation is easier, essentially because deviation is less benecial. This positive
e¤ect on cooperation more than o¤sets the negative e¤ect due to the lax punishment.
A theoretical exercise such as this may have some derived practical value. For instance, it is
well known that governments of the United States, the European Union, China, and India widely
subsidize their cotton farmers despite the World Trade Organisations ruling some of these subsidies
illegal6 . Clearly, subsidies provide their recipients with a noticeable competitive advantage relative
to the rival producers in some of the poorest regions of the world, especially in West Africa, and
nally push down the market price. Our analysis suggests that tacit cooperation based on stick and
carrotstrategies may be a useful retaliatory device in the hands of farmers who nd themselves at
a lower competitive disadvantage because they are not subsidized.
In the model presented, we admittedly made the most simple assumptions about cost and de-
mand. Nonetheless, the derivations proved rather complicated, albeit feasible, and the intricate
features of our results may carry over to more general functional forms. One interesting exten-
sion would be to assume that the outsider has a strategic behaviour more sophisticated than just
playing non-cooperatively in each period of the game. For example, there might be attempts to
cooperate between the outsider and a rm cheating on the fringe agreement. Alternatively, since
cooperation within the fringe benets the outsider, one could imagine that the latter takes part in
the punishment.
6 Appendix A
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
For condition (9) to be satised, we must have C   P (x)  0, otherwise each rm of the fringe would
have an incentive to deviate from qC during the cooperative phase so as to enter in the punishment phase
and get higher prots. Clearly, when x > ~x, C   P (x) is positive since  (x) =  cx < 0. When
x  ~x, we have C  P (x) = (1=18n) [3nx  2] [3nx  ]. Hence, C  P (x) = 0 has two solutions:
x = =3n and x = 2=3n. Furthermore, the second derivative of C P (x) with respect to x is positive,
which implies that this function has a global minimum. It follows that C  P (x) is positive if and only if
x 2 [0; x][ [x;+1), otherwise P (x)  C . This last case might be possible because P (x) internalizes
the best reply function of the outsider. Hence, the cartel could act as a Stackelberg leader by choosing x
so as to maximize P (x), in which case we would have P (x)  C . But in that situation, the strategy
prole 
 
qC ; x

is not subgame perfect because any rm within the fringe would have an incentive to
6 see http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/may/24/american-
cotton-subsidies-illegal-obama-must-act, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/nov/15/cotton-
subsidies-west-africa, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/02/AR2010060204228.html
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deviate from the cooperative phase in order to get P (x) instead of C . To summarize, the incentive
compatibility constraint (9) in the cooperative phase can be satised if and only if x 2 [0; x] [ [x;+1).
We now show that, for any x 2 [0; x], the incentive compatibility constraint (11) in the punishment
phase cannot be satised. Indeed, to ensure subgame perfection, one must also have DP (x)  C .
Suppose this inequality does not hold. Then any rm would have an incentive to deviate in the cooperative
phase to earn D  C . This would be worthwhile because in the subsequent period, i.e., when punishment
begins, the cheater would deviate again to get a greater prot level than that obtained along the cooperative
path, thereby triggering the same defection scenario forever. Formally, DP (x)  C implies P (x)  1,
so that (11) cannot be satised. Since x < ~x, we have x  ~x for any x 2 [0; x], and hence DP (x) =
[(   x(n  2))=4]2. This function is decreasing on [0; =(n  2)], and then increasing for any x  =(n 
2). Since x < =(n  2), DP (x) is decreasing on [0; x] and reaches a minimum in x on [0; x]. Evaluating
at x the prot of the deviator along the punishment path, one obtains DP (x) = [ (n+ 1) =6n]2, which
is greater than C (The inequality DP (x)  C reduces to (n   1)2  0). It follows that the incentive
compatibility constraint (11) cannot be satised for x 2 [0; x]. Therefore, a necessary condition for the two
incentive compatibility constraints to be simultaneously satised is that x 2 [0; x] [ [x;+1).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
When c  1=n, DP (x) = 0 for any x  x^ as shown by (17). However, the payo¤ function P (x) during
the punishment phase depends on whether x 2 [x^; ~x) or x  ~x as shown by (14). Suppose rst that x  ~x
which implies P (x) =  cx. In that case, (18) has only one solution:
x1 =
1
c

 (n  1)
6n
2
: (A1)
The punishment output x1 is relevant if x1  ~x. The equation x1   ~x is quadratic in c and therefore
x1   ~x = 0 has two roots, viz.,
f(n) =
n(n+ 7) + 1  3pn (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
2 (n  1)2 : (A2)
and
F (n) =
n(n+ 7) + 1 + 3
p
n (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
2 (n  1)2 : (A3)
Furthermore, the second derivative of x1   ~x with respect to c is positive, which implies that this function
has a global minimum in c. Therefore, we have x1  ~x for any c =2 (f(n); F (n)). First, recall that
assumption 1 states that c < 1=2, which guarantees that any rm has a positive market share in the stage
game. Second, one can easily verify that f(n)  1=2, this inequality being equivalent to (n  1)2  0, and
that F (n) > 1=2. It follows that one can have x1  ~x only for c  f(n).
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Since we are in the case c  1=n, one must also verify that f(n)  1=n. We have
f(n)  1=n = n
3 + 5n2 + 5n  2  3npn (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
2n (n  1)2 : (A4)
The numerator of this expression is positive if

n3 + 5n2 + 5n  22  3n3 (n+ 2) (2n+ 1). This in-
equality can be equivalently rewritten as (n   1)2(n + 2)(n + 1)(n2   9n + 2)  0, which is veried for
any n  ~n with ~n =  9 +p73 =2 ' 8:77.
Therefore, if n  9 and 1=n  c  f(n), then x1 (greater than ~x) solves (18). Finally, to ensure that
x1 is the MCSP, we need to verify that 
P (x) is increasing in x for any x  x1  ~x. Again, for any x  x^,
we have DP (x) = 0, implying that P (x) =  P (x) =[C   P (x)]. Since P (x) is always decreasing
in x, clearly, P (x) is increasing in x whenever x  x^. Since x1  ~x  x^, x1 given by (A1) is indeed the
MCSP when n  9 and 1=n  c  f(n).
If c > f(n), then x1 < ~x, implying that x1 is not the MCSP. Then, if (18) admits a solution, it
must be lower than ~x. We now investigate whether there exists a solution within the interval [x^; ~x). When
x 2 [x^; ~x), we have P (x) = x [(   nx) =2] and still DP (x) = 0. In this case, (18) has two roots. The
lower root is 
h
3n pn (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)i =6n2, which is negative for any n  4. The upper root is
x01 =

h
3n+
p
n (n+ 2) (2n+ 1)
i
6n2
: (A5)
The punishment output x01 is relevant only if x^  x01 < ~x. The inequality x01 < ~x reduces to c > f(n),
while the inequality x01  x^ reduces to (n + 1)(n2   9n + 2)  0, which is equivalent to the inequality
f(n)  1=n or n  9. Therefore, if n  9 and c > f(n) > 1=n, then x01 solves (18) on [x^; ~x). Furthermore,
this punishment level is the MCSP because, again, P (x) is increasing in x whenever x  x^.
Finally, suppose that n < 9, implying that c  1=n > f(n). In this case, neither x1 nor x01 can be the
MCSP. If (18) admits a solution, then it must be lower than x^, implying DP (x)  0 and V P  0. In
this case, we have P (x) = x [(   nx) =2] and DP (x) = [(   x(n  2))=4]2. Equation (18) has two
roots, namely =3n and (5n   2)=3n (n+ 2). The lower root does not satisfy Lemma 1 and hence the
relevant solution is the upper root (satisfying Lemma 1), i.e.
x001 =
(5n  2)
3n (n+ 2)
: (A6)
One can check that x001 < x^ reduces to  n2+ 9n 2 > 0, which implies that n < 9. Finally, to ensure that
x001 is the MCSP, we need to verify that 
P (x) =

DP (x)  P (x) =[C   P (x)] is also increasing in
x on [x001 ; x^). When x < x^, we have
P (x; n; ) =
9n [   x(n+ 2)]2
8 (   3nx) (2   3nx) : (A7)
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Calculating the derivative of this expression, we have
@P (x; n; )
@x
=
9n [   x(n+ 2)] [ (5n  8)  9nx (n  2)]
8 (   3nx)2 (2   3nx)2 : (A8)
This derivative is positive whenever x  =(n+ 2) > x > (5n  8)=9n(n  2). Since x001 > =(n+ 2),
we have that P (x) is increasing in x on [x001 ; x^). Since 
P (x) is also increasing in x for any x > x^, x001 is
the MCSP for any n < 9.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
When c < 1=n and x  x^0, we have DP (x) = 0 and P (x) =  cx since x^0 > ~x. Again, (18) has one
solution, given by (A1) . One must verify that x1  x^0. The equation x1   x^0 = 0 is quadratic in c and
hence has two roots, viz.,
h(n) =
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2   3n
2
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2
; (A9)
and
H(n) =
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2 + 3n
2
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2
: (A10)
Furthermore, the second derivative of x1   x^0 with respect to c is positive, which implies that this function
has a global minimum in c. Therefore, we have x1  x^0 for any c =2 (h(n); H(n)). Again, one can observe
that H(n) > 1=2, while that h(n) < 1=2. Since one must have c < 1=2, one can have x1  x^0 only for
c  h(n).
Since we are in the case c < 1=n, we now evaluate the di¤erence between h(n) and 1=n. We have
h(n)  1=n =
(n  2)
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2   3n2
2n
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2
(A11)
The numerator of this expression is positive if (n   2)2[(n  1)3 + 9n2]  9n4. This inequality can be
equivalently rewritten as (n  1)2 (n+ 2) n2   9n+ 2  0, which is veried for any n  ~n, where
~n =
 
9 +
p
73

=2. We then have h(n)  1=n for any n  9, while the inequality is reversed for any
n < 9. Hence, when c < 1=n, x1 solves (18) if n  9 or if n < 9 and c  h(n) < 1=n. Finally, when
x  x^0, we have P (x) =  P (x) =[C   P (x)]. Since P (x) is always decreasing in x, P (x) is
increasing for any x  x^0. Therefore, when c < ~x and n  9 or n < 9 and c  h(n) < 1=n, x1 given by
(A1) is the MCSP.
Suppose now that n < 9 and h(n) < c < 1=n; so that there does not exist a punishment output level
higher than x^0 satisfying (18). We then look for a punishment level satisfying (18) lower than x^0. When
x < x^0, the prot functions P (x) and DP (x) depend on whether x 2 [~x; x^0) or x < ~x, as shown by (14)
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and (17). Assume rst that x 2 [~x; x^0), implying P (x) =  cx and DP (x) = [(1  c  x (n  1)) =2]2.
Equation (18) then admits two roots, given by
{02 =
3n [(n  1)  c(n+ 1)] 
q
2 (n  1)4   36n2c [(n  1)  cn]
3n (n  1)2 (A12)
and
x02 =
3n [(n  1)  (n+ 1)] +
q
2 (n  1)4   36n2c [(n  1)  cn]
3n (n  1)2 ; (A13)
where  = (1  2c). We now show that {02 given by (A12) does not satisfy Lemma 1, i.e., that x  {02.
The equation x  {02 is quadratic in c and has two roots, given by
c(n) =
 
n2 + 2n  2  npn2 + 6n+ 33
(n2 + 16n  4) (A14)
and
C(n) =
 
n2 + 2n  2+ npn2 + 6n+ 33
(n2 + 16n  4) : (A15)
The lower root c(n) is negative. Furthermore, the second derivative of x {02 with respect to c is negative,
which implies that this function has a global maximum in c. Therefore x {02 is positive (i.e., x  {02) for any
c 2 [0; C(n)]. Since we are in the case c < 1=n, a su¢ cient condition to have x  {02 is that 1=n < C(n).
A su¢ cient condition for this last inequality to be satised is that 1=n <
 
n2 + 2n  2 =(n2+16n 4) or
that n [n(n+ 1)  18] + 4 > 0, which is indeed veried for any n  4. It follows that {02 does not satisfy
Lemma 1.
The punishment output x02 is relevant if ~x  x02 < x^0. The inequality x02 < x^0 is equivalent to c > h(n).
Furthermore, x02   ~x is quadratic in c and hence x02   ~x = 0 has two roots, given by  1 and
g (n) =
n  4
5n  2 : (A16)
Since the second derivative of x02  ~x with respect to c is negative, x02  ~x has a global maximum and hence
x02  ~x only for c  g(n).7
Recall that we are now in the case n < 9 and h(n) < c < 1=n. First, one can observe that the sign
of g(n)   1=n is the same as the sign of (again) n2   9n + 2, which is negative for n < 9 (thus implying
7 With this constraint, we can now verify that the term under the radical in the numerator of (A13), i.e.,
(1  2c)2 (n  1)4   36n2c [(n  1)  cn], is positive for any c  g(n). The derivative of this term with respect
to c is  4(1  2c)2(n  1)4   36n2 [(n  1)  2cn], which is negative since c < 1=n < (n  1)=2n for any n  4. Now
replacing c by g(n) in the term under the radical in (A13), we obtain

3(n3   8n2 + 3n  2)=(5n  2)2, which is
strictly positive. This implies that the term under the radical in the numerator of (A13) is strictly positive for any
c  g(n).
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g(n) < 1=n). Second, we must verify that g(n) > h(n). We have
g (n)  h(n) =
3

n(5n  2)  (n+ 2)
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2

2(5n  2)
q
(n  1)3 + 9n2
 : (A17)
The numerator of this expression is positive if  n5+15n4 51n3 31n2 8n+4  0 or if n3( n2+15n 
51)  31n2 + 8n  4. The right-hand term of this inequality is always positive, while the left-hand term is
positive only if n 2  15 p21 =2;  15 +p21 =2 ' [5; 21; 9; 79]. Therefore, a necessary condition for
g (n)  h(n) to be positive is that n = f6; 7; 8g since we are now assuming that n < 9. However, one can
easily verify that the above inequality is not satised for n = 6, but only for n = 7 or n = 8.8 Hence, x02
solves (18) only for n 2 f7; 8g and h(n) < c  g(n) < 1=n.
Finally, to ensure that x02 is the MCSP, we need to verify that 
P (x) =

DP (x)  P (x) =[C  
P (x)] is also increasing in x on [x02; x^
0). When x < x^0, we have
P (x; n; c) =
9n
h
4cx+ [(1  c)  x(n  1)]2
i
4 [9nxc+ (1  2c)2] : (A18)
Calculating the derivative of this expression with respect to x, we have
@P (x; n; c)
@x
=
9n

x(n  1)2 9nxc+ 2(1  2c)2  (1 + c) c2(n  8)  c (3n  8) + 2(n  1)	
4 [9nxc+ (1  2c)2]2 :
(A19)
We need to show that the numerator of this expression is positive for any x  x02. Denote by 	(x; n; c) the
term in f:g in the numerator of this expression. Calculating the derivative of 	(x; n; c) with respect to x,
we obtain @	(x; n; c)=@x = 18n(n  1)2[9nxc+ (1  2c)2], which is positive, implying that 	(x; n; c) is
increasing in x. Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for the numerator of @P (x; n; c) =@x to be positive for
any x  x02 is that 	(x; n; c)

x=x02  0. Unfortunately, one cannot obtain the sign of 	(x; n; c)

x=x02
independently of n and c. Therefore, we also calculate the derivative of 	(x; n; c) with respect to c. We
obtain @	(x; n; c)=@c = x(n   1)2[9nx + 8 (1  2c)] + (n   6) + 24c2 + nc(4   3c), which is always
positive since n 2 f7; 8g and c < 1=n. Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for @P (x; n; c) =@x
to be positive for any x  x02 and c 2 (h(n); g(n)] is that 	(x; n; c)

x=x02;c=h(n)  0 when n = 7 and
n = 8. When n = 7, we have 	(x; n; c)

x=x02;c=h(n);n=7 = 6174
p
73(
p
73 7)=5329 ' 15:28 > 0, while
when n = 8, we have 	(x; n; c)

x=x02;c=h(n);n=8 = 82944
p
919(
p
919   24)=844561 ' 18:80 > 0. It
follows that P (x; n; c) given by (A18) is increasing in x for x  x02, and hence x02 is the MCSP when
n 2 f7; 8g and c 2 (h(n); g(n)].
8 Using Mathematica, one nds that the relevant roots which solve g(n)   f(n) = 0 are given by n^ =h
6 + (378  3p1137])1=3 + (378 + 3p1137)1=3
i
=3 ' 6; 78 and ~n =

9 +
p
73

=2 ' 8:77.
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Suppose now that n 2 f7; 8g and h(n) < g(n) < c < 1=n. Then, neither x1 nor x02 can be the MCSP.
If (18) admits a solution, then it must be lower than ~x, implying DP (x)  0 and V P  0. In this
case, we have P (x) = x [(   nx) =2] and DP (x) = [(   x(n  2))=4]2. As previously shown, (18)
admits one solution satisfying Lemma 1 which is given by (A6) provided that x001  ~x. One can easily
check that this last constraint is equivalent to c > g(n). Now, again assuming that c > h(n), suppose
that n < 7 (implying 1=n > h(n) > g(n)). In that case, we also have that neither x1 nor x02 can be
the MCSP. Moreover, the inequality c > g(n) is necessarily satised since c > h(n). Thus, when n  7
and h(n) < c < 1=n, the solution to (18) is also given by x001 . Finally, to ensure that x
00
1 is the MCSP, we
need to verify that P (x) =

DP (x)  P (x) =[C  P (x)] is also increasing in x on [x001 ; ~x). For any
x < ~x, P (x) is still given by (A7), which has been shown to be increasing in x for any x  =(n+ 2).
Since x001 > =(n+ 2), x
00
1 is the MCSP for n 2 f7; 8g and g(n) < c < 1=n or n < 7 and h(n) < c < 1=n.
6.4 The minimum discount factor 02(n; c)
We show here that 02(n; c) is strictly lower than 1 and that it is increasing in c for h (n) < c  g(n) < 1=n
and n = f7; 8g. When n = 7, we have
02(7; c) =
182
7
h
1(c) + c
p
2(c)
i ; (A20)
where 1(c) = 2 + 13c   20c2 and 2(c) = 36   438c + 487c2. We have 01(c) = 13   40c, which is
positive for any c < 1=7. Hence, 1(c) is increasing in c, so that a su¢ cient condition to have 1(c) > 0
for any c 2 (h(7); g(7)] is that 1(0) = 2 > 0. Similarly, we have 02(c) =  438 + 974c, which is negative
for any n < 1=7. Hence, 2(c) is decreasing in c and reaches a minimum at c = g(7) = 1=11. We
have 2(1=11) = 25=121 > 0, implying that 2(c) is positive for any c 2 (h(7); g(7)]. Furthermore, the
derivative of 02(7; c) with respect to c is given by
@02(7; c)
@c
=
 18
h
3(c) + 7 (3  2c)
p
2(c)
i
7
p
2(c)
h
1(c) + c
p
2(c)
i2 ; (A21)
where 3(c) = 36 585c+536c2. We have 03(c) =  585+1072c, which is negative for any c < 1=7. Hence,
3(c) is decreasing in c, and furthermore is negative at c = h(7) =
p
73  7 =2p73, implying that 3(c)
is negative for any c 2 (h(7); g(7)]. We then need to evaluate the sign of	 (c) = 3(c)+7 (3  2c)
p
2(c).
We have 	0 (c) < 0 since 02(c) < 0 and 
0
3(c) < 0. Evaluating 	 (c) at c = h(7), we have 	 (c) = 0,
and hence 	 (c) is negative for any c 2 (h(7); g(7)]. This implies that 02(7; c) is increasing in c and that
it reaches a maximum at c = g(7) = 1=11. We have 02(7; c)

c=g(7) = 729=1295 ' 0:5629, and hence
02(7; c) < 1 for any c 2 (h(7); g(7)]. Furthermore, 02(7; c) reaches a minimum at c = h(7) and we have
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that 02(7; c)

c=h(7) = 1(7) = 9=16 = 0:5625. Since we also have 
0
2(7; c)

c=g(7) < 
0
1(7) = 81=41 '
0:5786, we can conclude that 1(7) < 
0
2(7; c) < 
0
1(7) for any c 2 (h(7); g(7)].
When n = 8, we have
02(8; c) =
24012
32
h
4(c) + 3c
p
5(c)
i ; (A22)
where 4(c) = 49+308c 452c2 and 5(c) = 2401 25732c+28036c2. We have 04(c) = 308 904c, which
is positive for any c < 1=8. Hence, 4(c) is increasing in c, so that a su¢ cient condition to have 4(c) > 0
for any c 2 (h(8); g(8)] is that 4(0) = 49 > 0. Similarly, we have 05(c) =  25732 + 56072c, which is
negative for any n < 1=7. Hence, 5(c) is decreasing in c, and reaches a minimum at c = g(8) = 2=19.
We have 5(2=19) = 1089=361 > 0, implying that 5(c) is positive for any c 2 (h(8); g(8)]. Furthermore,
the derivative of 02(8; c) with respect to c is given by
@02(8; c)
@c
=
 7203
h
6(c) + 24 (7  4c)
p
5(c)
i
32
p
5(c)
h
4(c) + 3c
p
5(c)
i2 ; (A23)
where 6(c) = 2401  33796c+ 30340c2. We have 06(c) =  33796 + 60680c, which is negative for any
c < 1=8. Hence, 6(c) is decreasing in c, and furthermore is negative at c = h(8) =
p
919  24 =2p919,
implying that 6(c) is negative for any c 2 (h(8); g(8)]. We then need to evaluate the sign of  (c) =
6(c) + 24 (7  4c)
p
5(c). We have 0 (c) < 0 since 05(c) < 0 and 
0
6(c) < 0. Evaluating  (c) at
c = h(8), we have  (c) = 0, and hence  (c) is negative for any c 2 (h(8); g(8)]. This implies that 02(8; c)
is increasing in c and that it reaches a maximum at c = g(8) = 2=19. We have 02(8; c)

c=g(8) = 175=288,
and hence 02(8; c) < 1 for any c 2 (h(8); g(8)]. Furthermore, 02(8; c) reaches a minimum at c = h(8), and
we have that 02(8; c)

c=h(8) = 1(8) = 49=81 ' 0:6049. Since we also have 02(8; c)

c=g(8) = 
0
1(8) =
175=188 ' 0:6076, we can conclude that 1(8) < 02(8; c) < 01(8) for any c 2 (h(8); g(8)].
Finally, we compare 02(7; c), 
0
2(8; c), 
0
1(6) and 1(9). We have
02(8; c)  02(7; c) =

h
7(c) + 16807c
p
2(c) + 1728c
p
5(c)
i
224
h
1(c) + c
p
2(c)
i h
4(c) + 3c
p
5(c)
i ; (A24)
where 7(c) = 5390 + 41083c   75788c2. We have 07(c) = 41083   151576c, which is positive for any
c < 1=7. Hence, 7(c) is increasing in c and furthermore 7(0) > 0. It follows that 
0
2(8; c) 02(7; c) > 0
for any c 2 (h(7); g(7)]  (h(8); g(8)]. Furthermore, the maximum of 02(8; c) is (again) 02(8; c)

c=g(8) =
175=288 ' 0:6076, which is lower than both 1(9) = (4=5)2 = 0:64. Finally, the minimum of 02(7; c)
is (again) 02(7; c)

c=h(7) = 9=16 = 0:5625, which is greater than 
0
1(6) = 5=9 ' 0:5556. We then have
01(6) < 
0
2(7; c) < 
0
2(8; c) < 1(9).
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